When Dimensions Collide:

The Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs

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Abstract

Theories of issue evolution and issue manipulation suggest that 'political losers' in the party system can advance their position by introducing a new issue dimension. According to these theories, a strategy of *issue entrepreneurship*, i.e. the attempt to restructure political competition by mobilizing a previously non-salient issue dimension, allows political losers to attract new voters and reap electoral gains. In this study, we examine the extent to which these expectations hold by exploring issue entrepreneurial strategies by political parties when applied to the issue of European integration. Using multilevel modelling to analyse European Election Study data, we firstly show that voters are more likely to cast their ballot for parties which are losers on the extant dimension based on concerns related to European integration. Secondly, a time-series cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that parties which employ an issue entrepreneurial strategy are more successful electorally. In other words, voters are responsive to the issue entrepreneurial strategies of parties. These findings have important implications for our understanding of party competition and electoral behaviour in multiparty systems.

Key words: issue entrepreneurship, issue evolution, European integration, party competition, issue voting.

This is the art of politics: to find some alternative that beats the current winner.
(Riker, 1982: 209).

Over the years much attention has been devoted to how many dimensions best describe party competition and voting behaviour: a single dimension relating to left/right ideology or multiple dimensions that capture socio-economic and socio-cultural issues (see for example Downs, 1957, Inglehart, 1977; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008, also Benoit and Laver, *this issue*, Bakker et al. *this issue*)? Notwithstanding the importance of conceptualizing and measuring issue dimensionality, we have a limited understanding of how new issues become salient and how changes within the dimensional structure of party and electoral competition occur, especially within multiparty competition. This study is devoted to studying the mechanisms underlying something that E. E. Schattschneider (1960) eloquently coined the "conflict over conflicts". Schattschneider argues that politics is essentially about which political conflicts come to dominate the political agenda. Complex societies produce a multitude of diverse conflicts over public policy, "the game of politics depends on which of these conflicts gains the dominant position: The process in which one or several of these issue conflicts gain political dominance involves a mobilization of bias" (Schattschneider, 1960:62). Political parties play a pivotal role in this 'mobilization of bias'. When parties are losers on the dominant conflict dimension they have a powerful incentive to promote new issues to improve their electoral standing. As Riker noted in the above quote, they have an interest in finding an issue that "beats the current winner". That is, they are motivated to engage in a strategy of *issue entrepreneurship* by mobilizing conflict on a new issue dimension to change the basis on which voters make political choices and thereby potentially improving their electoral fortunes. This study examines who initiates the mobilization of new conflicts, and to what extent these issue entrepreneurs succeed in their strategy.

To address this issue, we build on Carmines and Stimson's (1986, 1989) seminal theory of 'issue evolution'. According to this theory, issues evolve when parties that are losers in the current political game seek to promote conflict on a new issue dimension. This strategy of issue entrepreneurship is only successful to the extent that voters are aware of differences in position on the new issue and change their behaviour on the basis of the polarisation of issue attitudes. While the model of issue evolution has been applied to

explain the emergence of issues, such as slavery (Riker, 1982), racial segregation (Carmines and Stimson 1986), abortion (Adams, 1997) and 'culture wars issues' (Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002) in the US context, the question remains of whether this model can be applied to explain issue evolution in multiparty systems.

The aim of this study is to explore the effect of issue entrepreneurship strategies in European multiparty systems. Specifically we ask: who are the initiators of issue evolution in multiparty systems, and how do we conceptualize and measure the success of such strategies of issue entrepreneurship? In line with the theories of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989, 1993) and issue manipulation (Riker, 1982, 1986, 1996), we argue that those parties that occupy losing positions in the party system are more likely to benefit from the emergence of a new issue. In a two party system losers can be easily classified as parties in opposition, but this distinction between political winners and losers is less clear-cut within the context of a multiparty system. This study therefore adapts the issue evolution model to distinguish between three types of parties: *mainstream government parties*, *mainstream opposition parties* and *challenger parties*. This three-fold distinction is important in the multiparty system context, since mainstream opposition parties are reluctant to act as issue entrepreneurs due to strategic considerations about potential future governing coalitions. In previous work, we have demonstrated that challenger parties are the most likely issue entrepreneurs in multiparty competition, and thus to play a key role in the politicization of new issues (Hobolt and De Vries, 2010). Here, we go one step further to examine whether the issue entrepreneurial strategy of challenger parties is successful in terms of generating the desired reactions from voters. Two expectations can be derived from our model of issue entrepreneurship. First, that challenger parties generate a response by voters on a new issue dimension, that is, voters are more likely to vote on the basis of preferences on the new dimension when choosing between a challenger and a non-challenger party. Second, that parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy attract new voters in elections.

These theoretical propositions are tested by examining the effects of mobilizing issue competition regarding the European Union (EU). The EU issue provides an excellent testing ground as every EU member state is confronted with issues arising from European

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integration. Consequently, we can test the issue entrepreneurship model in a wide variety of political contexts. Moreover, we can utilize three rich data sources on party and voter attitudes towards European integration, namely the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys, and the European Election Studies (EES). These data sources allow us to examine both individual-level responses to party strategies and over-time changes in the electoral fortunes of issue entrepreneurs. Our empirical strategy is thus two-fold. First, we estimate a multilevel model of electoral behaviour, using EES 2004, to test the proposition that citizens choosing challenger parties in national elections rely on concerns related to the EU issue dimension. Second, we estimate a time-series cross-sectional model to test whether an issue entrepreneurial strategy yields electoral benefits. The results support our expectation that new issue concerns matter more to voters of challenger parties and that issue entrepreneurial strategies enhance the electoral fortunes of parties.

Conflict of Conflicts: How Issues Evolve

The study examines which parties employ issue entrepreneurial strategies, i.e. introduce new issue dimensions, in multiparty systems, and to what extent these strategies are successful. In order to understand the success of issue entrepreneurs, we build on the seminal work on issue evolution from the US context (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989, 1993). In the words of Carmines and Stimson, issue evolution can be defined as "issues capable of altering the political environment within which they originated and evolved. These issues have a long life cycle…The crucial importance of this issue type stems from the fact that its members can lead to fundamental and permanent change in the party system" (Carmines and Stimson, 1989:11). Figure 1 outlines the sequence and structure of the issue evolution process.

[Figure 1 about here]

In Figure 1, elite polarisation on an issue is followed by a delayed, inertial reaction by the mass electorate. According to this understanding, an issue becomes increasingly salient and, consequently, so divisive that this issue alters the link between voters and parties and produces long-term changes in party identification and coalitions (Carmines and Stimson,

1986, 1989). Two critical steps are necessary to link the elite policy position to mass issue realignment. First, the mass public takes cues from the elite partisan actors and alters its perception of the parties with respect to the new issue dimension. Importantly, voters must be aware of the differences in the position of the parties on the new issue (*clarity*). Second, the new issue must evoke an emotional response among citizens. Public awareness of a new issue dimension is not sufficient; voters must also care about this issue and the differences in party positions (*affect*). If these conditions are met, they may lead to changes in mass identification on the basis of the polarisation of issue attitudes (*alignment*).

The impetus behind this issue evolution is first and foremost the strategic behaviour by partisan elites (Carmines and Stimson, 1986:902; see also Rovny, *this issue*). In this model, parties that are losers on the dominant dimensions of competition have the most powerful incentive to promote a new issue. A parallel can be found in Riker's theory of issue manipulation (1982: Chs. 8-9), which posits that parties that are losers in the political game have an incentive to manipulate the agenda by introducing new issues, as this can create disequilibrium in the political system that can unseat the governing status quo.[2] Hence, strategic political actors will pick issues where there is potential for clear partisan polarisation (i.e. clarity) and public attention and response (i.e. affect), since this in turn could lead to changes in mass identification and thus changes in power-structures.

These theories of strategic issue manipulation assume a simple two-party model, but in the next sections we extend the model to take into account the more complex dynamics of party competition in multi-party systems. Firstly, we ask: who are the initiators of issue evolution, i.e. the issue entrepreneurs, in multiparty systems? Thereafter, we consider how to conceptualize 'success' in a multiparty context.

Issue Entrepreneurship: Initiators of Change

As in the classic models of issue evolution and issue manipulation, we expect political losers to seek to promote a new issue to attract new voters. One way in which a party can increase

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[2] Riker uses the issue of slavery as an example of such conscious manipulation of the social agenda to generate disequilibrium in the political system. He argues that this issue was introduced to put a strain on the incumbent "winning" coalitions. The slavery issue was chosen because this new issue was able to split the persistent, winning Jeffersonian-Jacksonian coalition, and thereby create a disequilibrium that allowed the opposition to win (Riker, 1982: Ch.9).

the salience of an issue is to adopt a polarising position on that issue. When parties are in perfect agreement on an issue, it is less likely to become salient in the political debate (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). We coin the term *issue entrepreneurship* to denote the party strategy of active mobilization of new policy issues that have been largely ignored by the political mainstream or the mobilization of a policy position on an issue that is substantially different from the current position of the mainstream. To establish which parties are likely issue entrepreneurs, we must first address the question of which parties can be classified as political losers in multiparty system. The work of Carmines and Stimson and Riker was developed in a two-party system and suggests that political losers are those parties that currently do not occupy political office. This distinction is less clear-cut in multiparty systems, which are mostly governed by a coalition of parties and where some parties routinely alternate between government and opposition while others may never enter government coalitions (Hobolt and Karp, 2010). We therefore distinguish between three types of political parties: *challenger parties*, *mainstream opposition parties*, and *mainstream government parties*. Mainstream parties regularly alternate between government and opposition and occupy winning positions within system. Mainstream government parties are the clearest example of what it means to be a political winner as they occupy political office and are likely close to both the mean party and mean voter position on the main dimension of political competition. Mainstream opposition parties resemble their government counterparts as they also occupy mainstream positions on the dominant dimension of political conflict, but they currently do not inhabit political office.[3] Due to their overall advantageous position in the system mainstream parties have an incentive to reinforce existing patterns of political competition and the policy issues underlying them. As a result, they are not likely issue entrepreneurs. Challenger parties on the other hand have less to lose from engaging in issue entrepreneurship. We define challenger parties as parties that have not previously held political office.[4] Parties thus cease to be classified as challenger parties, if they enter government. The category of challenger

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[3] Due to the fact that the responsibilities of regional governments differ substantially throughout Europe, our conceptualization of holding office refers to national government participation only and does not include regional government representation. This allows us to ensure functional equivalence across the different country contexts under investigation.

[4] We operationalized this as parties that have not held cabinet posts in the post-war period.

parties includes a wide range of parties, including far right and far left parties and religious, regionalist and green parties.[5]

The distinction between mainstream and challenger parties relates to recent work on party competition in multiparty systems which also distinguishes between mainstream and so-called 'niche parties' (see Meguid, 2005, 2008; Adams et al., 2006). In Meguid's (2005, 2008) important work on the electoral success of niche parties, she defines niche parties as those parties that "reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics" and raise new issues that "are not only novel, but they often do not coincide with existing lines of political division" and that "differentiate themselves by limiting their issue appeals" (2005: 347-348). In their study of how niche parties respond to public opinion, Adams et al. (2006: 513) classify niche parties as "members of the Communist, Green, and extreme nationalist party families". Unlike these studies, the objective of our theoretical model is to predict the impact of party type on the likelihood of mobilizing a new political issue and the effect of this strategy, and hence it would be potentially tautologous to define party types on the basis of their issue-politics. So, while there may be an overlap between our category of challengers and 'niche parties', it is important to note the conceptual distinction, since we define challenger parties on the basis of their office-holding experience, rather than in terms of whether they belong to a certain party family or differentiate themselves in terms of single-issue appeals.

Given the losing position they hold within the political system, we expect challengers to be more likely issue entrepreneurs than mainstream parties. This expectation deviates from the two-party logic of the classic issue evolution models of Carmines and Stimson as well as Riker according to which mainstream opposition parties would also be expected to have incentives to promote new issues. The key difference in a multiparty context is that coalition governments create differential strategic incentives for parties. In multiparty systems, mainstream opposition parties are currently in opposition, but tend to routinely alternate between opposition and government and often find themselves in coalition with other parties. Introducing a new policy issue may thus be risky for mainstream opposition parties as they do not want to remove themselves too much from competitors within the

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[5] To provide the reader a sense of the parties we classify as challengers, we have compiled a list of challenger parties included in our analysis in Table A.1 of the appendix.

mainstream as this may jeopardize their coalition potential. Consequently, our expectations for mainstream government and mainstream opposition parties are very similar: we do not expect mainstream government parties to act as issue entrepreneurs as they already occupy political office and mainstream opposition parties may also refrain from an issue entrepreneurial strategy as the potential electoral gains cannot be guaranteed to outweigh the possible costs associated loss of future coalition partners. Instead 'issue adaptation' may be beneficial to parties when, as Riker has pointed out, "neither side has an advantage on an issue" (1996:105). In contrast, challengers, i.e. new parties and those that have never been in government, have not built a reputation for being good coalition partners. Due to uncertainty about their behaviour, engaging in coalition agreements with challenger parties is a potentially risky strategy and the potential costs of forming a coalition with these parties are comparatively high (see Bartolini, 1998; Sartori, 2005; Warwick, 1996; Laver and Schofield, 1998). Unlike mainstream parties, challengers thus have every reason to act as issue entrepreneurs as they have very little to lose in terms of future coalition potential. In previous work, we have shown that when it comes to the issue of European integration, challenger parties are more likely issue entrepreneurs than mainstream parties (Authors, 2010). That is, challengers are more likely to seek to mobilize the European issue and take a different position than mainstream parties. Since European integration was conceived as a top-down project based on a broad elite consensus, the 'mainstream' position among European political parties has been broadly pro-integrationist (e.g. De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2009).[6] Adopting a polarising position is one way for parties to strategically manipulate the salience of an issue. In the next section, we discuss when strategies of issue entrepreneurship can be considered a success.

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[6] It is important to note that there may be some specificities regarding the EU issue that may explain why challenger parties are likely issue entrepreneurs as anti-EU parties are simply not viable government parties. Although this reasoning is not necessarily in conflict with our theoretical framework, it does raise questions about the direction of causality. In order to address this issue, we would need to test our expectations about the issue entrepreneurship of challengers in other policy areas.

Mobilization of Bias: Changing the Game

The strategy of issue entrepreneurship is only the first stage in the model of issue evolution proposed by Carmines and Stimson. As outlined in Figure 1, the next important step is that voters become aware of the different positions on the new issue and respond to it, ultimately leading to a change in voting behaviour and in the electoral fortunes of parties. According to Carmines and Stimson, the outcome of the issue evolution process is a "critical moment" of "a mass polarization along the new line of issue cleavage large enough to be noticeable" (1989:160). While such critical moments in the model of issue evolution are less dramatic than a wholesale 'realignment', they still involve a substantial redefinition of the issue bases of political competition and a radical change in the party system. But what counts as successful issue entrepreneurship in a system with multiple parties, where office-seeking is not necessarily the only, or even primary, goal for many issue entrepreneurs? To adapt our model of issue entrepreneurship to the context of multiparty systems, we adopt a more modest approach to what might account for successful issue entrepreneurship. We argue that to understand changes in party competition in multiparty systems it is important to extend the model to include issue entrepreneurial strategies that do not necessarily lead to a fundamental shift in the nature of party competition - in the way that for example the issue of race transformed American politics - but nevertheless alter the basis of voting behaviour for a group of voters and the electoral fortunes of some parties. Literature on party competition in parliamentary democracies has recognised that party objectives combine a mixture of vote-, office- and policy-seeking aims (Strøm, 1990). Due to the fragmented nature of party competition in these systems, some parties have incentives to mobilize new issues, even if they do not appeal to a majority of voters, since vote-seeking and even office-seeking strategies do necessarily not entail winning a plurality of votes. Given their marginalised position in the political system, office-seeking is often not the primary goal of challenger parties. Instead they may be satisfied to mobilize new issue demands among a smaller cohort of voters (Kitschelt, 1988; Hug, 2001).

Hence, we need to develop criteria for a successful issue entrepreneurship strategy that does not necessarily involve a radical mass realignment and the defeat of the party in office. We argue that the essence in whether the mobilization of a new issue has succeeded lies in that "[t]he public must not only perceive a difference in party issue stands, but it must

also care about this difference" (Carmines and Stimson, 1989: 161). To the extent the people care about a political issue, this should become incorporated in the considerations that are relevant to vote choices, and ultimately affect the electoral choices that people make. From the perspective of spatial voting theory, we would expect that voters are more likely to vote for a party that is closer on that dimension, all other thing being equal. This should benefit parties that adopt positions closer to the median voter on the new issue dimension (see Enelow and Hinich, 1984). Our criteria for a successful issue entrepreneurship strategy are thus two-fold: First, voters' attitudes towards the new issue dimension must influence their vote choices. Second, parties that engage in an issue entrepreneurial strategy must benefit electorally from this strategy. Since we expect that challengers are the most likely issue entrepreneurs, we hypothesize that voters choosing to vote for a challenger party are more likely to vote on the basis of concerns related to the new issue dimension. Moreover, we expect that, over time, parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy will experience an increase in their electoral fortunes, as voters are attracted by their stance on the new issue dimension. This leads to the following testable hypotheses about the extent of successful issue entrepreneurship:

H1: Voters choosing to vote for a challenger party are more likely to base their vote choice on preferences related to the new issue dimension, all other things being equal.

H2: Parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy are more likely to increase their vote share, all other things being equal.

These propositions are tested in a subsequent section, but first we discuss the data, operationalization and methods used in the empirical analysis.

Data, Operationalization and Methods

In order to test our expectations about the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs, we employ a dual empirical strategy. First, we estimate a model of vote choice for the three different party types we distinguished, mainstream government, mainstream opposition

and challenger parties. We examine if vote choice for challengers compared to vote choice for mainstream parties is more affected by attitudes towards a new issue, i.e. European integration. Second, we explore whether challengers indeed benefit electorally from their issue entrepreneurial strategy by exploring if issue entrepreneurship increases parties' vote shares. Let us first elaborate the data, operationalization and methods used in more detail.

Analysis 1: Effect of the New Issue Dimension on Vote Choice across Party Types

To test if voting for a challenger party is more strongly affected by voters' attitudes on the new issue dimension compared to mainstream parties we use the European Elections Study (EES) from 2004. Our choice to rely on the EES instead of national election surveys stems from the breadth (cross-nationally) of the EES and the nature of the questions included. Unlike many national election surveys, the EES contains questions probing voters' evaluations of the EU.[7] This information is paramount, as it allows us to determine the extent to which voters' preferences regarding the EU affect vote choices for the three party types differently. Moreover, since the EES administers comparable surveys in member states across the EU, we are able to analyse the electoral consequences of issue entrepreneurship across a diverse set of institutional and political contexts, namely 20 Western and Eastern European countries.[8]

Our dependent variable is whether a voter voted for a mainstream government, mainstream opposition or challenger party in their latest national election.[9] It is constructed

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[7] Some readers may question whether our results hold given that the focus and timing of the European Election Study (EES) surveys may lead to overstated European Union (EU) effects. Thus far, a number of previous studies using national election study data have provided evidence of EU effects on national vote choice, so we would contend that this basic finding is not in doubt (see de Vries, 2007 for example). Moreover, our focus is on differences in the strength of EU attitudes on vote choice for challenger, mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties across different member states. Since any presumed cueing effect in the EES surveys should be constant across national contexts, this should not be a threat to inference in our study.

[8] The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.

[9] Note that since we are merely interested in carving out the differential impact of voters' attitudes on the new issue dimension on their vote choice for challenger, mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties respectively, we excluded non-voters from the analysis.

using the following EES question: "Which party did you vote for during the last general election of [year]?" Based on respondents' party vote choice, we created a trichotomous variable, with 1 denoting a vote for a mainstream party in government, 2 a vote for a mainstream party in opposition and 3 denoting a vote for a challenger party.[10] As discussed above, we define challengers as those parties who have never participated in a governing coalition since 1945 which we determine on the basis of the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (henceforth, CHES) (see also Hobolt and De Vries, 2010). A list of challenger parties included in the analysis can be found in the Appendix. In our dataset 1185 respondents voted for challengers, 3737 voted for mainstream opposition parties and 4705 for mainstream government parties.

In our analysis, we aim to determine whether vote choice for challengers is affected more by voters' attitudes towards the EU than vote choice for mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties. We capture this differential impact by including a measure of voters' attitudes towards the membership of their country in the EU to our model of vote choice. The EES 2004 includes a question asking voters if they feel that their country's EU membership is "(1) a good thing, (2) a bad thing or (3) neither good nor bad". We recoded this variable so that higher values reflect more Eurosceptic attitudes and "neither good nor bad" serves as the neutral middle category. We expect challenger parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurship strategy to vocally mobilize a Eurosceptic stance, since as discussed above the mainstream party position on the issue is broadly pro-integrationist (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002).

To determine if this effect of Euroscepticism on vote choice occurs independently of other sources of voting behaviour, we control for non-EU-related policy and performance factors as well as for the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. The policy and performance variables include voters' left/right ideological position, government approval, and prospective and retrospective national economic evaluations. The socioeconomic

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[10] Since this question is based on respondents recalling their previous vote choice, we explored the robustness of the results presented in the next section using a trichotomous variable based on the EES vote intention question: "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" Both conceptualizations of vote choice for the three different party types yield similar results. These results can be obtained from the authors.

controls include education, age, and social class. These latter variables are incorporated to control for dominant models explaining vote choice, such as economic and cleavage-based voting. In addition, the inclusion of these controls ensures that a respondent's attitude towards Europe is not merely a proxy for other factors.

To test the effect of voters' EU preferences on their ballot choices for challenger, mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties, we employ a multinomial logistic (MNL) regression model. A MNL model allows us to deal with the trichotomous nature of our dependent variable. We also make use of multilevel analysis since neglecting the hierarchical structure of the EES 2004 data in which voters are nested in 20 country contexts could lead to an underestimation of standard errors and spurious inferences (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). A multilevel approach corrects for the dependence of observations within contexts, i.e. intra-class correlations, and adjusts for the clustered nature of the data in both the within and between parameter estimates. We estimate our multilevel MNL model with second order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) approximation using MlWin 2.12.[11]

Analysis 2: Effect of Issue Entrepreneurship on Changes in Vote Share

In a second step, we explore if these challengers indeed benefit electorally from their issue entrepreneurial strategy. Introducing new policy issues in the political arena constitutes a risky strategy as the new issue may not catch on with voters or even worse may backfire and be electorally costly and alienate potential coalition partners. Consequently, parties will only become issue entrepreneurs when they have reason to believe that they can benefit electorally (see Hobolt and De Vries, 2010). The second stage of our analysis explores if issue entrepreneurship in fact increases parties' vote shares. In order to do so we employ a longitudinal perspective bringing together data on the electoral gains and losses of parties

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[11] We use second order PQL rather than the standard estimation procedure using first order marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) as the later has proven to produce severely biased estimates in a MNL set-up (Browne, 2003). Also due to the fact that our sample includes only 20 second-level units, the maximum likelihood estimation used in Table 1 may not perform optimally (see Gellman and Hill, 2007). Consequently, we also conducted an analysis using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (see Gellman and Hill, 2007; Jackman, 2000) to inspect the robustness of our findings. The results of this robustness check show that the Bayesian setup yields substantially similar results to those reported in Table 1. These results are available upon request from the authors.

from 14 European countries between 1984 and 2006. Unfortunately, the data necessary to tap into parties' issue entrepreneurial strategies is only available over time for Western European countries, so Eastern European countries were excluded in the second stage of our analysis.[12]

The dependent variable here is the change in vote share of a party between consecutive national elections. The main independent variable is the degree to which a party acts like an issue entrepreneur on the new policy issue of European integration. As highlighted earlier, we define issue entrepreneurship as a strategy with which parties actively promote a new issue and adopt a position that is different from the mean position within the party system. Note that this definition combines salience with position-taking (see also Hobolt and De Vries, 2010). For both parties' salience and position towards European integration we rely on the CHES data (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010). The CHES data are particularly well suited for our purposes as the dataset includes data on party positions and salience of European integration and a variety of other issues across time and space.[13] To capture issue entrepreneurship we simply multiply each party's EU salience score with the distance of this same party's EU position to the mean party position in the system on the same policy issue: $(MP_i-P_i)*SP_i$. So for each party P we multiply its salience score on the new policy issue i with (MP_i-P_i), where MP_i stands for the mean party position on i, P_i stands for the individual party's position on i, SP_i stands for the importance party P attaches to the new policy issue i, and i stands for the issue of European integration. A party's position on European integration is measured by using the question asking experts to classify the 'overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration' on a 7-point scale, where 1 signifies strong opposition and 7 strong support. We operationalize (MP_i-P_i) by subtracting an individual party's position on the EU, i.e. P_i, from the mean EU position of all parties in the system, that is to say MP_i. This distance measure is constructed in such a way that positive values characterize those parties

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[12] We include all Western European member states of the EU except for Luxembourg. Unfortunately, Luxembourg is not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which is used to operationalize the different party characteristics in our model and therefore could not be included in the analysis.

[13] Several studies have cross-validated the party position and salience measures based on CHES data and found that expert data often outperform other data sources like the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007).

that are more pro-EU than the average party in the system, while negative values indicate those parties that are more sceptical. By multiplying this distance measure with the EU salience measure, EU issue entrepreneurship captures the extent to which a party adopts a position away from the political mainstream, i.e. is more Eurosceptic, and attaches importance to this position.[14]

Our main objective is to examine the effect of issue entrepreneurship on changes in parties' vote shares. In order to fully specify a model of changes in vote share and to minimize omitted variable bias, we include several controls. First, we include the government status of a party. Studies from the US context, especially from congressional election research, often demonstrate that incumbents hold an advantage when up for re-election (see for example Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Payne, 1980). Incumbents can promote themselves, their work and their accomplishments as a part of their official position and duties. In addition, incumbents are likely more visible in the media and therefore benefit from name recognition and established reputations (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 2006). From this perspective, we would expect government status to be positively correlated with changes in vote shares, but we also know that voters are likely to punish governments for poor performance (Key, 1964). Indeed, a vast literature has shown that voters tend to punish governments when economic conditions are poor (see e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Either way, controlling for incumbency status is important. This variable is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating if a party was part of the government coalition within the legislative period under investigation.

Second, we add two variables tapping into parties' positions on the dominant dimension of political competition: a party's left/right position as well as parties' left/right positions squared. Our starting point is that issue entrepreneurship, i.e. mobilizing and introducing conflict on a new issue dimension, may bring about electoral gains for parties which have losing positions on the dominant dimension of political competition. In order to test if an effect of issue entrepreneurship is not merely a proxy for parties' extremity on the

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[14] Note that we use a more Eurosceptic position to capture those parties taking a 'new' position on European integration. We do so as an extensive literature has demonstrated that the consensus position on European integration in Western European party systems is a pro-European position (see for example De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2009). This finding is again confirmed by the data employed here.

dominant dimension of political competition we include both a party's left/right position as well as its squared term. A party's left/right position is measured using CHES responses to the question regarding parties' left/right position on economic issues in a given year, where 0 stands for extreme left and 10 for extreme right.

Third, our model includes a variable tapping into the distance between a party's left/right position and the mean voter left/right position. Parties are expected to lose votes when they remove themselves the mean voter on the dominant dimension of political competition (Hinich and Enelow, 1984). Consequently, a distance is included in our model as an important control variable. In order to capture the distance between a party's left/right and the mean voter position on this same dimension we calculated |MVi-Pi| which stands for the absolute distance between the mean voter position on the left/right dimension, i.e. MVi, and a party's left/right position, Pi. Parties' left/right were derived from the respective CHES datasets and mean voter positions where obtained by calculating the mean of the left/right self-placements for a given country in a given year using Eurobarometer (EB) surveys.[15] Finally, our model also controls for party size which is measured by the percentage of votes obtained in the latest parliamentary elections. Party size is included as it may be argued that larger parties are less likely to be issue entrepreneurs. In addition, changes in vote shares may simply be larger in magnitude for larger parties.

Our dataset in the second stage of the analysis includes 165 parties nested in years, i.e. a period from 1984 to 2006, and 14 countries, namely all Western European EU member states, except Luxembourg. In order to explain change in parties' vote shares, we are dealing with differences between parties, across countries as well as over time. We have to estimate a model that deals with the cross-sectional structure, that is to say the panel differences based on countries and parties. In order to deal with party and year effects, we use a simple party-year panel setup and add country dummies to deal with the existence of possible unobserved differences between countries. But this model set-up alone does not allow us to confront all possible problems that may arise using panel data estimation strategy. We have to deal with the issue of heteroscedastic error terms as it is very likely that the error terms have different variances between panels and are also correlated across different panels. We

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[15] Specifically the EB surveys ask respondents "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale?"

estimate panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to address with these issues (Beck and Katz, 1996; Beck and Katz, 1995).[16]

Empirical Analysis

In the theoretical section we argued that the success of issue entrepreneurs in multiparty systems can be evaluated using two criteria. First, voters' attitudes towards the new issue dimension must influence their vote choices and since we expect challengers to be the likely issue entrepreneurs, ballot choices for challenger parties should more strongly be affected by voters' concerns on the new issue dimension. Secondly, we expect that, over time, parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy will experience an increase in their electoral fortunes, as voters choose on the basis of the new issue dimension. In order to test these hypotheses, we present two sets of empirical results, which we discuss in turn.

Empirical Results 1: Effect of New Issue Dimension on Vote Choice across Party Types

To explore if vote choice for challengers is driven to a larger extent by voters' attitudes regarding European integration (see hypothesis H1) compared to vote choice for mainstream government and mainstream opposition parties, we estimate two sets of multilevel multinomial logit models using data from the 2004 EES for 20 Western and Eastern European countries. Our first model includes only the effect of voters' EU attitudes on voting for a challenger party versus a mainstream government party or for a mainstream opposition party versus a mainstream government party. The second model, the full model, also includes control variables.[17]

[Table 1 about here]

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[16] As there seems to be some disagreement in the literature about how to deal with heteroscedastic error terms and potential causal heterogeneity, we estimated model specifications of our time-series cross-section analysis including and excluding country fixed effects. These analyses yield almost identical results, and are available upon request from the authors.

[17] Note that we also specified the same models including abstention as a choice category in order to deal with the IIA assumption underlying a MNL model. The substantive findings presented here do not change when including abstention to the model (these results are available upon request from the authors). Since we have no particular expectations regarding abstention, we present the results for the models including vote choices, excluding abstention.

Table 1 shows the results from both models. We find strong support for our main expectation, a voter's choice for challengers versus mainstream government party is indeed strongly and significantly affected by her attitudes towards European integration. When a voter is more Eurosceptic, the odds of voting for a challenger versus a mainstream government party increases, but this is not the case for choosing a mainstream opposition versus a mainstream government party. In the latter case, Euroscepticism has almost no effect on vote choice. These results indicate that voters' EU attitudes contribute significantly to vote choice for challengers and more so than is the case for mainstream parties.[18] This finding is consistent with our conjectures and robust when we control for other factors influencing vote choice, such as left/right ideology, evaluations of the government or economy as well as socioeconomic factors.

The results presented in Table 1 are log odds are therefore substantively not very interesting. Given that we are interested not only in statistical significance, but also in relative magnitude of the variables included, we compute discrete changes in the predicted probabilities of choosing one of the other alternatives over a mainstream government party. In order to do so, we change the value of one predictor from one standard deviation below the mean to the one standard deviation above the mean, while holding all other predictors at their respective mean or mode in the case of dummy variables. To compare the size of the marginal effects, we not only include the discrete changes for changes in Euroscepticism, but also for all other predictors. Table 2 shows the discrete changes.

[Table 2 about here]

As we saw earlier the effect for Euroscepticism on casting a ballot for a challenger compared to a mainstream government party is statistically significant. This being said, however, its effect is relatively small compared to the discrete changes we observe for government approval, left/right ideology or prospective economic evaluations (please note

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[18] Since the Euroscepticism variable we employ in the analysis has only three categories, we also ran the same analysis including dummies for "EU membership is a bad thing" and "EU membership is neither good nor bad" as a robustness check. This analysis yields identical results, and can be obtained from the authors.

here that since government approval is a dichotomous variable Table 2 reports a minimum-maximum change in predicted probability). The probability of voting for a challenger party versus a mainstream government party increases by almost 6 percent when a voters moves from a moderately pro-EU to moderately Eurosceptic stance on European integration. This effect is much larger than a moderate change in retrospective economic evaluations and of similar size to a change in prospective economic evaluations. The predictor with the largest effect on vote choice for a challenger party versus a mainstream government party is government approval. These results are in line with the extant literature on voting behaviour which has shown the prominence of performance and economic evaluations on vote choice. On the whole, we see a very similar pattern in size for the factors influencing vote choice for a mainstream opposition versus a mainstream government party and a challenger versus a mainstream government party. This being said, Table 2 does clearly show that the effect of voters' attitudes on the new issue dimension, i.e. European integration, affects vote choice for challengers twice as much as for mainstream opposition parties. This finding is in line with our first hypothesis (H1) stating that we expect challenger parties to benefit more strongly from higher levels of Euroscepticism compared to mainstream parties as these parties are demonstrated to act as issue entrepreneurs when it comes to the European issue by mobilizing a Eurosceptic stance. The findings presented in Tables 1 and 2 are clear testimony to the importance of issue entrepreneurship in explaining differences in vote choice between mainstream government, mainstream opposition and challenger parties.

Empirical Results 2: Effects of Issue Entrepreneurship on Changes in Vote Share

Let us now turn to the second part of exploring the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs Do parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy attract new voters in elections? To test this proposition, we estimated a model explaining changes in vote shares across time (1984-2006) and space (14 Western European countries). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 below.

[Table 3 about here]

The results displayed in Table 3 show that parties that actively mobilize their Eurosceptic stance indeed reap electoral benefits in elections within the 22 year time-frame under investigation. This is even the case when we control for other important alternative explanations of changes in vote share such as government status or parties' left/right ideological position. As expected, government parties do better in elections, while we find no significant effect of proximity to the mean voter on the left/right dimension or party size. These results lend credence to the proposition that parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy benefit electorally.[19]

When we compare the magnitude of the different factors influencing parties' vote shares by computing discrete changes, in this case the change in vote shares when we move the value of an independent variable from one standard deviation above to one standard deviation below the mean ceteris paribus, we find that the effect for issue entrepreneurship is fairly modest. While a one standard deviation change for left/right ideology for example corresponds to a 1.93 percentage points decrease in vote shares, the same change in issue entrepreneurship increases a party's vote share by .26 percentage points. The results are in line our theoretical expectation that parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy will increase their votes share, although the effects are relatively small.

On the whole, these results support our second hypothesis (H2) stating that parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy attract more voters than parties that are not engaging in such a strategy, all other things being equal. In addition, the findings corroborate existing work on the role of European integration on vote choice in national elections that demonstrates that EU attitudes affect voters' ballot box decisions only when the European issue produces a salient conflict among parties (see De Vries, 2007).

Conclusion

Questions pertaining to the multidimensional nature of political competition have been high on the agenda of students of party and electoral competition for decades, especially among

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[19] These results are also robust when we jackknife the sample, that is to say when we drop one country or one time point at a time.

those scholars studying multiparty systems. This being said, we currently have a limited understanding of how changes within the dimensional structure of party and electoral competition occur, especially within multiparty competition. This study is devoted to studying these mechanisms. Building on the issue evolution model by Carmines and Stimson we explore which parties can reap electoral benefits by introducing a new issue dimension. We devote our attention to the parties attempting to restructure political competition by mobilizing a previously non-salient issue dimension and by taking a diverging stance from the political mainstream, i.e. issue entrepreneurship. Specifically, we explore if these issue entrepreneurs are electorally successful. For the purpose of understanding dimensional change in multiparty systems, we amend the model of issue evolution for a two-party system in two distinct ways. First, we introduce a typology of political losers within multiparty competition. While the existing work on issue evolution has no difficulty in classifying losers on the dominant dimension of political competition since it focuses on two-party competition, the distinction between political winners and losers is less straightforward within the context of a multiparty system. Therefore we distinguish between three types of parties that characterize multiparty competition: mainstream government, mainstream opposition and challenger parties. This three-fold distinction is important in multiparty systems, since mainstream parties are reluctant to act as issue entrepreneurs due to strategic considerations about potential future governing coalitions. Challengers are then the parties that engage mostly in issue entrepreneurship. Second, we develop different criteria to determine the success of an issue entrepreneurial strategy. While Carmines and Stimson define the success by a substantial redefinition of the issue bases of political competition and a realignment of mass identification, this definition is too restrictive in multiparty systems. Due to the fragmented nature of party competition in these systems, some parties have incentives to mobilize new issues, even if they do not appeal to a majority of voters. Challenger parties may be satisfied to mobilize new issue demands among a smaller cohort of voters. Hence, we argue that in order for challenger parties to engage in successful entrepreneurship they first have to generate a response by voters on a new issue dimension, that is, voters are more likely to vote on the basis of preferences on the new dimension when making a choice between a challenger and a non-

challenger party. Second, that parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy should attract new voters.

By examining the party mobilization of the issue of European integration and the respective voter responses, our empirical results support the idea that an issue entrepreneurship strategy allows political losers on the dominant dimension to attract new voters and reap electoral gains. Using a dual empirical approach where we firstly employ a multilevel multinomial logit model of EES data to demonstrate that voters are more likely to vote for parties which are losers on the extant dimension based on their EU attitudes. In a subsequent step, a time-series cross-sectional analysis of the electoral fortunes of 165 West European parties from 1984 to 2006 shows that parties which employ an issue entrepreneurial strategy benefit electorally. Overall, we find that voters are indeed receptive to the issue entrepreneurial strategies of challenger parties. These findings have important implications of our understanding of party and electoral competition within multiparty systems as they outline the differential electoral effects of issue mobilization between mainstream and challenger parties. Our amended issue evolution model provides clear expectations about which parties have an incentive to introduce dimensional conflict and aim to change the nature of structure of the party system in order to reap electoral gains. These are parties that hold losing positions on the dominant dimension of political competition. Consequently, the nature of party competition within multiparty systems is largely an interplay between mainstream parties attempting to retain the current dimensional competition while challenger parties will aim at redirecting political competition. Even though these issue entrepreneurial strategies may not necessarily bring about large-scale realignments within the system they may have important electoral consequences by changing voter alignments and thus affect election outcomes.

The results presented here give rise to important avenues of future research. We demonstrate that the dimensional basis of party and electoral competition is never a stable equilibrium, but always under pressure of the actions and initiatives by challengers, and this raises further questions about the nature of competition between mainstream and challenger parties. How do mainstream parties respond to the strategies of challengers? When do 'challenger issues' become 'mainstream issues'? Related to this it may be a worthwhile avenue for future research to examine if media attention for mainstream and challenger

parties and the issues they mobilize differs. Since an issue entrepreneurial strategy involves the mobilization of a previously non-salient issue media attention seems of crucial importance for success. Notwithstanding the importance of these topics for future research, this study has provided key new insights into our understanding of the causes and consequences of changes in the dimensional structure of party and electoral competition within multiparty systems. We theorize and empirically substantiate that parties in losing positions on the dominant dimension of political competition play a crucial role in instigating dimensional change and benefit electorally from this strategy.

Appendix

[Table A.1 about here]

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Figures & Tables

Figure 1: Carmines and Stimson's Model of Partisan Issue Evolution

Source: Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989)

Table 1: Effects of Euroscepticism on Vote Choice for Party Types

Party Type	Model (1)		Model (2)	
	MOP	**CP**	**MOP**	**CP**
Individual-Level Predictors				
Intercept	-.220**	-1.577**	.460**	-.517*
	(.044)	(.071)	(.145)	(.217)
Eurosceptcism	.004	.126*	.017	.134*
	(.040)	(.062)	(.040)	(.060)
Left/Right Ideology	-	-	.013	-.079**
			(.010)	(.016)
Retrospective Economic Evaluations	-	-	-.053	-.033
			(.028)	(.043)
Prospective Economic Evaluations	-	-	-.072*	-.110**
			(.029)	(.044)
Government Approval	-	-	-.680**	-.892**
			(.051)	(.082)
Education	-	-	-.006	.008
			(.004)	(.006)
Income	-	-	.022	-.040
			(.017)	(.026)
Religiosity	-	-	-.004	.039
			(.021)	(.032)
System-Level Predictors				
Communist Legacy	-	-	-.026	.046
			(.059)	(.090)
Model Summary				
Variance Component	3.731**		3.153**	
N (System, Individual)	(21, 9627)		(21, 9627)	

Notes: The table entries are log odds with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is multinomial in nature (Mainstream Government Party, MGP; Mainstream Opposition Party, MOP; Challenger Party, CP) and Mainstream Government Party is the reference category. The models have been estimated using second order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) (Browne, 2003). Employing a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method yields almost identical results.

** significant at the p≤.01 level and * significant at the p≤.05 level (two-tailed).

Table 2: Discrete Changes in Choice Probabilities

	Δ P(MOP) 1 sd below -1 sd above	Δ P(CP) 1 sd below -1 sd above
Euroscepticism (0-2)	-2.41 %	5.56 % *
Left/Right Ideology (1-10)	6.16 %	12.19 % **
Retrospective Economic Evaluations (1-5)	-5,68 %	-2.60 %
Prospective Economic Evaluations (1-5)	-7.93 % *	-7.66 % **
Government Approval (0-1) [*min-max change*]	-44.23 % **	-38.05% **
Education (0-95)	3.18 %	-12.19 %
Income (1-5)	6.45 %	-10.42 %
Religiosity (1-5)	-0.95 %	8.91 %
Post-communist Legacy (0-1) [*min-max change*]	-2.62 %	4.54 %

Notes: Table entries are changes in vote probabilities of voting for a mainstream opposition party or challenger party versus a mainstream government party in % when the value of a respective predictor move from 1 standard deviation (sd) below to 1 standard deviation above the mean whilst keeping all other variables at their mean value and dummy variables at their mode. Note that in the case of dummy variables, i.e. government approval and post-communist legacy, minimum to maximum changes are reported. The minimum and maximum values of the different variables are given in the first column in parentheses.

** significant at the p≤.01 level and * significant at the p≤.05 level (two-tailed).

Table 3: Effects of Issue Entrepreneurship on Changes in Vote Share

	Coefficients	PCSE
Predictors (min ,max)		
Issue Entrepreneurship (-16-16)	.014*	.005
Government Party (0-1)	.200**	.086
Left/Right Ideology (0-10)	-.151**	.076
Left/Right Ideology Squared (0-100)	.013**	.003
Distance to Mean Voter Left/Right (0-7)	.006	.008
Party Size (0-51)	.001	.008
N	*2484*	
Groups	*178*	

Notes: Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients correcting for panel-level heteroscedasticity with country dummies (not shown in table) and standard errors. The minimum and maximum values of the different variables are given in the first column in parentheses.

** significant at the $p \leq .01$ level and * significant at the $p \leq .05$ level (two-tailed).

Table A.1 : List of Challenger Parties

Country	Party	Party Name in English
Austria	GRÜNE	*The Greens*
	KPÖ	*Communist Party of Austria*
	Die LINKE	*The Left*
	Liste H.-P. Martin	*Hans-Peter Martin's List*
Belgium	VB - Vlaams Blok	*Flemish Interest*
	N-VA	*New Flemish Alliance*
	Agalev/Groen!	*Greens*
	RESIST	*Resist*
	Vivant	*For Individual Freedom and Work in a New Future*
	Ecolo	*Ecolo*
	Front National	*National Front*
	PTB-UA	*Belgian Labour Party*
Britain	Liberal Democrats	*Liberal Democrats*
	UK Independence Party	*UK Independence Party*
	Scottish National Party	*Scottish National Party*
	Plaid Cymru	*The Party of Wales*
	Green Party	*Green Party*
	British National Party	*British National Party*
	Scottish Socialist Party	*Scottish Socialist Party*
	Respect	*Respect*
	George Galloway	*George Galloway*
	Christian Alliance	*Christian Alliance*
	National Front	*National Front*
Czech Republic	KSÈM - Komunistická strana Èech a Moravy	*The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravi*
	SNK - Sdružení nezávislých a Evropští demokraté	*SNK-European Democrats*
	PB - Pravý blok	*Right Bloc*
	SŽJ - Strana za životní jistoty	*Party for Security in Life*
	BPS - Balbínova poetická strana	*Balbín´s poetic party*
	SPR-RSČ	*Coalition for Republic*
	SDS - Strana demokratického socialismu	*Party of Democratic Socialism*
	HA - Humanistická aliance	*Humanistic Alliance*
	SZR - Strana zdravého rozumu	*Common Sense Party*
	SV-SOS - Strana venkova – spojené občanské síly	*Rural Party - United Civic Forces*
	RMS - Republikáni Miroslava Sládka	*Miroslav Sládek's Republicans*
	CZ - Cesta změny	*Path of Change*
	ODA - Občanská demokratická aliance	*The Civic Democratic Alliance*
	VPB - Volba pro budoucnost	*Choice for the Future*
	NH - Nové hnutí	*New Movement*
	NDS - Národnì demokratická stran	*National Democratic Party*

Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti	*Socialist Peoples Party*
	Dansk Folkeparti	*Danish Peoples Party*
	Enhedslisten	*Leftwing Alliance*
	Fremskridstspartiet	*Progressive Party*
	Minoritetspartiet	*The Minority Party*
	Demokratisk Fornyelse	*Democratic Renewal*
Estonia	Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei	*Estonian United People's Party*
	Eesti Kristlik Rahvapartei	*Estonian Christian People's Party*
	Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Tööpartei	*Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party*
Finland	KD: Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit	*Christian Democrats in Finland*
	PS: Perussuomalaiset	*True Finns*
	SKP: Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue	*Communist Party of Finland*
	Liberaalit	*Liberals*
France	Extrême gauche – EXTG (LO/ LCR)	*Far left*
	FN, MNR (Front national, Mouvement National Républicain)	*Front National*
	MPF, RPF (Mouvement Pour la France / Rassemblement Pour la France	*The Movement for France*
	CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions)	*Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition*
	Pôle républicain de Jean-Pierre Chevènement	*The Republican Movement*
Germany	PDS	*The Party of Democratic Socialism*
	Republikaner	*The Republicans*
	Die Tierschutzpartei	*Animal Protection Party*
Greece	KKE (Kommunistiko Komma Ellados)	*Communist Party of Greece*
	LAOS	*Popular Orthodox Rally*
	DIKKI	*Democratic Social Movement*
	ENOSSI KENTROON	*Union of the Centre*
Hungary	MIÉP	*Party of Hungarian Justice and Life*
	MP	*Workers Party*
	MNSZ	*Hungarian National Alliance*
	ÖMCP	*Center Party*
Ireland	GP: Green Party	*Green Party*
	SF: Sinn Fein	*We ourselves*
Italy	Rifondazione comunista	*The Communist Refoundation Party*
	La Margherita	*Democracy is Freedom – The Daisy*
	Comunisti Italiani	*The Party of Italian Communists*
	Verdi	*Greens*
	SDI	*The Italian Democratic Socialists*
	Alleanza Popolare - UDEUR	*UDEUR Populars for the South*
	Italia dei valori	*Italy of Values*
	Radicali /Lista Bonino	*Italian Radicals*
	Alternativa Sociale con Alessandra Mussolini	*Social Alternative*
	Fiamma Tricolore	*Tricolour Flame*
Latvia	PCTVL	*For Human Rights in a United Latvia*

	Russian National Bolshevik Party	*Russian National Bolshevik Party*
	LSDSP	*Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party*
	Conservative Party	*Conservative Party*
	Future Party	*Future Party*
	United Social Democratic Welfare Party	*United Social Democratic Welfare Party*
	Latgales Gaisma	*Latgales' Light*
	Latvian Socialist Party	*Latvian Socialist Party*
	Latviesu Partija	*Latvian Party*
	SDS	*Social Democratic Union*
	Communists	*Communists*
Luxembourg	Déi Lenk	*The Left*
	Déi Gréng	*The Greens*
	ADR	*Alternative Democratic Reform Party*
	Fräi Partei Lëtzebuerg	*The Free Party of Luxembourg*
The Netherlands	Groen Links	*Green Left*
	LPF	*The Pim Fortuyn List*
	ChristenUnie	*Christian Union*
	SGP	*Reformed Political Party*
	SP	*Socialist Party*
	Leefbaar Nederland	*Liveable Netherlands*
	Partij voor het Noorden	*The Party for the North*
	Nieuw Rechts	*New Right*
	Partij voor de Dieren	*The Party for the Animals*
Poland	PSL	*Polish People's Party*
	SRP	*Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland*
	UW	*Freedom Union*
	UPR	*Union of Real Politics*
	National Electoral Committee of Voters	*National Electoral Committee of Voters*
	Initiative for Poland	*Initiative for Poland*
	All-Polish Citizens Caucus "OKO"	*All-Polish Citizens Caucus "OKO"*
	KPEiR-PLD Coalition	*National Party of Retirees and Pensioners*
	Anticlerical Progress Party "Racja"	*Anticlerical Progress Party*
	PPN	*Polish National Party*
	Confederation Defense Movement of the Unemployed	*Confederation Defense Movement of the Unemployed*
	Zieloni 2004	*Greens 2004*
	NOP	*National Revival of Poland*
	Together for the Future	*Together for the Future*
	PPP	*Polish Labour Party*
Portugal	Bloco de Esquerda	*Left Bloc*
	CDU (PCP-PEV)	*Democratic Unity Coaltion*
	Partido da Nova Democracia	*New Democracy Party*
	PCTP / MRPP	*Portuguese Workers' Communist Party*
Slovakia	ANO (Aliancia nového občana)	*The Alliance of the New Citizen*

	HZD (Hnutie za demokraciu) / ĽÚ (Ľudová únia)	*Movement for Democracy*
	SDA (Sociálnodemokratická alternatíva)	*Slovakian Socialdemocratic Party*
	Slobodné fórum	*Free Forum*
	SZS	*Green Party*
	Živnostenská strana Slovenskej republiky	*Craftsmen Party of Slovakia*
	Demokratická únia Slovenska	*Democratic Union of Slovakia*
	Slovenská udová strana	*The Slovak People's Party*
Slovenia	SMS - stranka mladih Slovenije	*Youth Party of Slovenia*
	SNS - slovenska nacionalna stranka	*The Slovenian National Party*
	SJN - Slovenija je naša	*Slovenia is Ours*
Spain	IU (Izquierda Unida) / IC-V	*The United Left*
	Regional Party of Center	*Regional Party of Center*
	Regional Party of Left	*Regional Party of Left*
	Ecologist Party	*Ecologist Party*

Note: The table includes a list of challenger parties include in our analysis of EES 2004 data.