

WORKING PAPER

All comments are very welcome!

# **You Have Got Mail! How Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations Shape Legislator Responsiveness in the European Parliament<sup>1</sup>**

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## ABSTRACT

For representative democracy to work, legislators need to be responsive to the concerns of ordinary citizens. One way in which this can be achieved is through constituency service. Two factors drive constituency service: extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. While extrinsic motivations lead legislators to be responsive based on the prospect of electoral rewards, intrinsic motivations increase constituency service as legislators want to perform the task for its own sake. Research to date suggests that extrinsic motivations are crucial determinants of constituency service. Yet, the evidence stems primarily from the US context characterized by a personalised ballot structure and campaign content that may bias current findings in favor of extrinsic motivations. We present evidence from a field experiment conducted in the European Parliament (EP). Our field experiment allows us to vary both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations of legislators. What is more, we are able to examine the way in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact. The interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations has largely been unexplored in the literature which is unfortunate as social psychologists and behavioural economists have demonstrated that extrinsic motivations “crowd out” intrinsic ones. Our findings suggest that while intrinsic motivations matter most for constituency service in the EP, they are dampened by the presence of extrinsic motivations. This evidence adds to our current understanding of constituency service and informs discussions about how to design institutions that make legislators more responsive.

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Responsiveness to voter needs and preferences is an important part of legislators' activities (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987). Yet, legislators can only represent voter preferences when they are aware of them, or put differently “the constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees” (Fenno 1977: 883). The notion that legislators know the preferences of their constituents underlies most classical theories of political representation. Surprisingly, however, recent research suggests that in today's world of constant information and professional polling, legislators often know only very little about voter preferences and what they do seem to know is often biased (Butler and Broockman 2011, Butler and Nickerson 2011, Broockman and Skovron 2013). Incomplete information about voter preferences has important consequences for political representation. A study by Butler and Nickerson (2011) suggests that providing legislators with more information about voter preferences makes them more likely to vote in line with constituents while work by Grose (2010) shows that information even increases participation rates in roll-call voting. Taking together this recent evidence suggests that information about constituency preferences matters a lot for shaping legislative behaviour.

This raises the question of when legislators are likely to be responsive to information from their constituents. Recent empirical evidence, primarily based on field experiments with legislators in the United States (US), seems to provide two different answers to this question (see Grose 2014). One body of work suggests that legislator responsiveness is primarily driven by *extrinsic motivations* (Grose 2010, Butler and Nickerson 2011, Dropp and Peskowitz 2012). Extrinsic motivation refers to a tendency for individuals to perform activities based on the anticipation of external rewards (Deci and Ryan 2000: 60). Applied here, legislators are expected to first and foremost be vote seekers and respond to voters when they think this will increase their chances to be re-elected (see Mayhew 1974). Another body of work points out that responsiveness of legislators may be largely driven by *intrinsic motivations* (Butler and Broockman 2011, Broockman, 2013, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). Intrinsic motivation refers to behavior that is driven by an internal desire to act rather than for some separable consequence (Deci and Ryan 2000:

56). Applying this to legislator responsiveness, legislators are expected to be responsive based on an internal desire to connect to voters or to express group loyalty (see Mansbridge 1999, also Pitkin 1967). Most of the field experimental evidence to date stems from the US context characterized by a highly personalised ballot and campaign environment. This makes constituency service crucially important for securing re-election and thus may bias evidence in favor of extrinsic motivations (for an overview of the work see Grose 2014: 364-66).

This study adds the existing body of work by exploring the degree to which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of legislators matter for constituency service. It does so by providing evidence from the first ever field experiment conducted with members of the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels. The EP is the only directly elected institution in the European Union (EU) and home to over 766 legislators from 28 different countries that represent almost 500 million eligible voters. There are several reasons to revisit legislator responsiveness and the role of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations more generally and in the context of the EP specifically. First, the EP provides us with a “laboratory setting” to examine the role of extrinsic motivations as its members are elected under a variety of electoral rules. The EP is a unique legislature in that each member state of the EU is allowed to adopt its own electoral rules and thus members of the same parliament are elected for the same time-span while facing starkly different electoral incentives to be responsive (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). Consequently, we are able to examine if legislators who face the highest electoral incentives in the EP are more likely to respond to voter messages compared to those competing in other contexts.

Second, we currently have a very limited understanding about the way in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact. Especially social psychologists (such as Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981) and increasingly behavioural economists (such as Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) demonstrate that extrinsic motivations “crowd out” intrinsic motivations. The presence of external rewards shifts the justification for an action from an internal desire to perform to an external one, something that is coined the *overjustification effect* (Leppner, Greene and

Nisbett 1973). Our experiment allows for an examination of this effect in the context of legislator behaviour. If the overjustification effect is applicable in a legislative context, our findings are crucially important for discussions about how to design institutional rules aimed at maximizing legislator responsiveness.

With regard to the EP specifically, our results have a bearing on the debate about the democratic deficiencies of EU politics (Moravcsik 2002, Føllesdal and Hix 2006, Farrell and Scully 2007). Over the past decade the EU has invested enormous efforts in making its institutions “more democratic and transparent” (see Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). In doing so EU officials aimed to combat claims that European politics suffers from a democratic deficit, which commonly refers to a perceived lack of accessibility of institutions to European citizens and a lack of political accountability (Rohrschneider 2002, Hobolt, 2012, Hobolt and Tilly 2014). Ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, signed on the 7<sup>th</sup> of February 1992, a number of constitutional changes have been introduced to amend possible democratic deficiencies and foster norms that strengthen representative democracy within the EP and other EU institutions. Given this background, it is interesting to explore constituency service in the EP as well as the role of intrinsic motivations.

Finally, the responsiveness of legislators to voters through emails or other online activity deserves attention in its own right, especially within the EP. Survey evidence suggests that MEPs find it extremely important to represent their constituents, 75.1 percent of MEPs claim this to be one of their most important aspects of their work, and 81.8 percent of MEPs consider online and email activity crucial to do so (Farrell, Hix and Scully 2010). Although we lack official statistics on the number of email or tweet messages MEPs receive, it seems fair to assume that responding to voter messages online is an important way in which members can communicate directly to their constituents.<sup>2</sup> Evidence from the US context suggests that members of Congress indeed receive an enormous amount of emails and letters, 200 million in 2004 alone for example, and that they

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<sup>2</sup> From media reports about the number of emails MEP receive in response to specific legislation they propose or reports they write, we know that the volume of voter email messages is large. For example, Portuguese Social Democrat MEP Edite Estrela received over 200.000 emails in December 2013 about her report on the sexual and reproductive rights of women (<https://euobserver.com/justice/123001> accessed 05.02.15).

respond to these messages seriously by spending time and staff resources to do so (Fitch and Goldschmidt 2005). Exploring constituency service is especially important in the context of the EP as legislative politics in the EU is characterized by scant media attention and low voter turnout (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Importantly, our experimental design in which actual voters send email messages to MEPs avoids possible problems of social desirability bias associated with surveys when it comes to measuring legislators' willingness to respond to voters and the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.

We conducted our field experiment in on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 in which voters from the 28 different member states who were eligible to vote in the May 2014 EP election sent an email message in their own respective language to an MEP from their own country. The content of the messages were randomized in terms of the voters' concerns raised which allows us to get at the intrinsic motivations of legislators. Extrinsic motivations were captured by comparing response rates of MEPs from different member states who face re-election or not under vastly different electoral rules. Specifically, we ask three questions. First, do legislators respond to voter messages? Second, to what extent can intrinsic and extrinsic motivations account for the variation in constituency service? And finally, how do intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact?

Our results indicate that compared to US legislators responsiveness within the EP is rather modest with roughly 28 percent of MEPs responding to voter messages while on average roughly 50 percent of US local, state or congress representatives respond (see for example Butler and Broockman 2011, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). This might not be entirely surprising given that the personalised ballot and campaign context in the US should trigger extrinsic motivations more than PR elections within the EU where often parties rather than candidates dominate the campaign. On average therefore constituency service should carry less weight for EU legislators compared to their US counterparts, and this is indeed what we find. Second, our results indicate that intrinsic motivations seem to matter most for responsiveness. This finding is in line with the idea that the possible electoral returns for constituency service are lower in the EP compared to the US due to

weaker constituency ties. Indeed, we also show that a response in our experiment did not make reelection in the subsequent May 2014 EP election more or less likely. Third, our findings suggest that extrinsic motivations matter in that they partly crowd out intrinsic motivations to be responsive. Intrinsic motivations matter less when the electoral incentives to be responsive are high. These findings present important new insights about how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations may matter for legislator responsiveness, how both sets of motivations interact as well as for the popular debate about the possible democratic deficit in EU politics.

We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the importance of studying legislator responsiveness and present our theoretical conjectures. Next, we will introduce our experimental design and the ethical considerations involved in this study. Finally, we present our results and discuss their implications for the study of legislator responsiveness generally and representation in the EP specifically.

### **Why Study Legislator Responsiveness Based on Constituency Service?**

A central question within the study of political representation is how well voters are able to control the policy decisions of their representatives. As Dahl (1971: 1, italics added) in his seminal work on representative democracy points out: “A key characteristic of [representative] democracy is the *continued* responsiveness of the government to the preferences of the people.” Indeed, the notion of representatives being delegates who follow instructions from their electorates is a classical model of political representation (Pitkin 1967).<sup>3</sup> The majority of studies to date examine legislator responsiveness to voter preferences based on roll-call voting (for classical work in Congress see Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1997, 2007 and on the EP see Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). When legislators vote in line with constituent preferences, we can conclude ex post that responsiveness of legislators to voter preferences is secured. Yet, responsiveness of legislators to voter preferences and needs occurs in other ways beyond roll-call voting as well. Evidence especially from the US

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<sup>3</sup> This delegate model of representation is often contrasted with the trustee model in which representatives as trustees make decisions based on their own judgments (for an overview see Pitkin 1967)

context suggests that representatives devote a significant share of their time and resources to constituency service that is to say activities such as responding to email, answering phone calls or sending out newsletters (see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987 on how legislators aim to cultivate a personal vote). The communication with constituents provides legislators with a more direct means through which to be responsive to voters and get informed about their needs and preferences. Voter messages provide legislators with a clearer sense of the exact needs and preferences of constituents as well as signals the importance of these concerns.

In addition, direct contact with legislators provides voters with an additional channel of policy influence. When voters contact legislators their interests are clear: they want a response (Butler and Broockman 2011). In case legislators respond, voters gain direct experience with legislator responsiveness. This in turn may make voters more likely to participate in the political process (Griffin and Keane 2006). Moreover, previous work points out that roll-call votes provide very little insight into legislative priorities (Hall 1996). Roll-call votes have a clear party strategic component as party leadership especially outside the US context in which party discipline is more pronounced aim to persuade legislators to toe the party line (Bowler et al 1999). Exploring the effort individual legislators are willing to put in to respond to voter concerns gives us a fuller picture about how representation may come about. Finally, providing a richer account of political representation in the EP is especially important given that voter involvement in European legislative politics is low (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Franklin and Hobolt 2011). The EP resides in Brussels, holds debates with contributions in a variety of different languages and receives rather scant media attention thus voters might be largely unaware of the voting behaviour of their MEPs (Rohrschneider 2002, Føllesdal and Hix 2006, see the work by Reif and Schmitt 1980 suggesting that EP elections constitute second-order national elections). Consequently, exploring the degree to which EP legislators are willing to respond to voter messages is crucial for assessing the representative links between MEPs and voters.

## **Why Might Legislators Respond More to Voter Messages Based on Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations?**

After we have established that constituency service is an important aspect of the representational repertoire of a legislator, we turn to the question what drives legislators to be responsive voters? Theoretical work thus far points towards two sets of motivations: *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* ones. Activity based on intrinsic motivation refers to behavior that is driven by internal rewards and an innate desire to fulfil psychological needs such as competence or a desire for relatedness. An intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity originates from inside the individual in order to enhance personal satisfaction or fulfilment (see White 1959, Deci and Ryan 2000). Legislators may wish to respond to voters based on internal norms and beliefs that this is how a legislator is supposed to act or with the aim of expressing certain group loyalties (Pitkin 1967, Mansbridge 1999). This contrasts with activities based on extrinsic motivations. These are driven by instrumental considerations and the prospect of external rewards or punishments. Extrinsic motivation relates to reasons to act in order to attain some separable outcome (Deci and Ryan 2000). Applied to legislator responsiveness, legislators are expected to respond to voters because it may enhance their chances of re-election would constitute extrinsic motivations for response (Mayhew 1974).

Both sets of motivations refer to two different ideas about the nature of legislative activity. A large body of empirical work suggests that electoral incentives are crucial for understanding legislators' roll-call voting and other legislative activity (Kousser, Lewis, and Masket 2007, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987). Especially responding to voter queries may be one of the easiest ways for legislators to connect to voters, cultivate a personal vote and enhance their reputations and electoral prospects (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987). In their classical study on the US and the UK, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987: 213-4) suggest that especially in marginal districts legislator responsiveness is primarily driven by electoral incentives. Echoing this conclusion, recent experimental evidence by Dropp and Peskowitz (2012) from the Texas state legislature suggests



that electoral incentives affect legislators' provision of legislative public goods and increases the number of bills legislators author.

Other work suggests that legislative activity might also be intrinsically motivated. Studies of representation have demonstrated that legislators' beliefs and preferences or personal backgrounds are important for understanding their legislative activities (see for example Miller and Stokes 1963). Surely, intrinsic motivations are extremely difficult to capture as they refer to motivations that originate within the individual (see Deci and Ryan 2000, Bénabou and Tirole 2003). An intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity originates from inside the individual in order to enhance personal satisfaction or fulfilment based on feelings of competence or a desire for relatedness (see White 1959, Deci and Ryan 2000). Some authors have conceptualized intrinsic motivations as those relating to an expression of group norms based on theories of descriptive representation (Butler and Broockman 2011, Broocknman, 2013, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). The idea is that politicians act on the basis of internal norms and beliefs and with their activities aim to demonstrate certain group loyalties or compliance to certain group norms (see also Mansbridge 1999). For example, female legislators might be more responsive to appeals to women's interests due to a belief in gender equality. Yet, the crux in deciding that motivations are intrinsic is that actors perform a task in the *absence* of external rewards or punishment (Bénabou and Tirole 2003). Recent experimental work from the US context aims to capture this contrast (Butler and Broockman 2011, Broocknman, 2013, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). For example Butler and Broockman (2011) demonstrate that non-black state legislators in the US are less likely to respond to requests of black constituents compared to others even when it is not electorally strategic to do so.

### **Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations and Constituency Service in the European Parliament**

Even though existing evidence finds some support for intrinsic motivations, extrinsic motivations based on re-election prospects are viewed as the key factor determining the degree of constituency service. Although this evidence is compelling, it stems primarily from the US context in which the

personalised ballot and campaign structure makes constituency service vitally important for re-election prospects. Hence, evidence to date might be somewhat biased in favor of extrinsic motivations. In order to test the importance of extrinsic motivations for constituency service more generally, one would like to vary the actual electoral incentives legislators face. This study is able to do exactly that. We conducted a field experiment within the EP that allows us to utilize a unique feature of this parliament, namely that its members are elected under different electoral rules (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). Each of 28 EU member states decide on their own electoral rules as long as it is a form of proportional representation (PR). While some countries employ closed list systems where parties present lists of candidates and voters can only choose between parties (for example in France, Greece, Italy, Romania or the UK), other countries employ open list systems where voters express candidate preferences (for example in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Slovenia). This distinctive feature of the EP allows us to study the effect of electoral incentives on constituency service. Open- and closed-list PR systems create different types of incentives for legislators (Carey and Shugart 1995, Chang 2005). While open list systems foster both inter- and intra-party competition, closed list systems promote mainly inter-party competition as voters have no influence on which candidate gets elected from the party list in these systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). As a result, open list systems are empirically associated with more private membership bills (Bräuniger, Brunner and Däubler 2012), personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995) and intra-party defections (Hix 2004). Against this backdrop, we expect legislators who are up for re-election in in open list systems to be more responsive to voter messages compared to those within closed list systems as the electoral incentives to respond so are higher. Only in open list contexts can MEPs realistically expect to be rewarded for their constituency service as voters can express their candidate preferences.

Constituency service might also be intrinsically motivated (Butler and Broockman 2011, Broockman, 2013, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). The crucial feature of intrinsic motivations is that the actor should perform an action in absence of any external reward or punishment (Bénabou

and Tirole 2003). A recent study by Broockman (2013) aims to capture this idea by manipulating the district from which the voter who sends the message resides. One set of messages stem from voters within the district of the legislator whilst another set is from voters residing outside the legislator's district. If a legislator is equally responsive to messages of voters residing within her district compared to outside, the behaviour of this legislator can be characterized as intrinsically motivated as only in-district voters can affect her re-election prospects. Broockman (2013) highlights the importance of intrinsic motivations by showing that black state legislators were consistently more likely to respond to black constituents' interests compared to non-black legislators even when voters resided outside their district. Within this study we could not realistically vary the district from which voter messages originate as a means to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic motivations as this would almost always imply changing the language in voter messages are written. As such one would not be able to disentangle intrinsic motivations from differences in response due to language.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, we maintain that responding due to intrinsic motivations does not need to be a result of group identities in the way Broockman (2013) has operationalized it. One could imagine that it could still well be the case that black legislators in the US context were more responsive to black constituents' interests even when these constituents do not reside in their district due to extrinsic motivations. For example because responding more to black constituent interests could help secure donations of sympathetic donors or spill over to their district and help secure the 'black vote'. In this study we conceptualise intrinsic motivations of legislators as an unbiased response. To be more specific, if a legislator is driven by an internal desire to respond, she should be equally responsive to voter messages regardless of the specific concerns raised. If MEPs respond based on intrinsic motivations, the content of the voter message should not affect the degree of responsiveness. Yet when constituency service of MEPs is based on extrinsic motivations we would expect MEPs to be more responsive to voter messages that are in line with the policy positions of the MEPs. In our experiment we capture this difference by varying the specific voter concerns

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<sup>4</sup> Most MEPs are elected within one country districts. Only six out of 28 countries are divided in multiple districts, specifically Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

detailed in messages. Voters send left versus right or EU versus national message given that left/right and pro-/anti-EU are the two core dimensions of electoral and party competition in the EU (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). If we find differences in response based on message content, for example a left-wing MEPs who favours the extension of EU competences is more responsive to voter messages couched in pro-left and pro-EU terms, this would constitute evidence against intrinsic and for the importance of extrinsic motivations as such a response enables the legislator to rally support amongst her own constituents.<sup>5</sup>

Our field experiment does not only allow us to examine how varying degrees of extrinsic as well as intrinsic motivations shape constituency service, but also how these two sets of motivations interact. Especially social psychologists (such as Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981) but also behavioural economists (such as Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) demonstrate that extrinsic motivations “crowd out” intrinsic motivations. The presence of external rewards may shift the justification for an action from an internal desire to perform to an external one. This is coined the *overjustification effect* (Leppner, Greene and Nisbett 1973). Indeed, a substantial body of experimental evidence suggests that the presence of external rewards or punishments can sometimes be in conflict with intrinsic motivation. In what is now a classical social-psychological experiment Deci (1975) shows that college students who were paid to work on an interesting puzzle worked significantly less often than those students who did not receive a reward. This finding has been substantiated in many other contexts and most importantly for us also in the political realm. In a study on Switzerland, behavioural economists Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) surveyed ordinary citizens in Swiss cantons where the government was considering to locate a nuclear waste repository. Their findings demonstrate that the proportion of respondents who were willing to support such a repository in their own community was halved when a public

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<sup>5</sup> One objection one could raise to this expectation is that the content of the message might prompt MEPs of opposing ideological views to be more responsive in order to convince the sender of an alternative viewpoint. This could also be evidence of extrinsic motivations. This expectation, however promising it may sound, finds little empirical support in the data. We hand-coded the content of each reply received to capture if the reply was either generic in nature, in line the with issues raised in the email message, or aimed at trying to convince the sender of an alternative view. Our findings indicate that roughly 95 percent of all replies were either generic in nature or in line with the issues raised in the email (these results are available upon request).

compensation was offered. Against this backdrop, we expect that intrinsic motivations to respond to voters decrease as the extrinsic motivations to do so increase. In the context of our experiment, we would find evidence for extrinsic motivations crowding out intrinsic ones if the differences in response rates based on message content are greater for MEPs who face higher electoral incentives, who are up for re-election in open list systems, compared to those of MEPs facing lower electoral incentives, who run in closed list systems. If this is the case, it would indicate that MEPs who face higher electoral incentives display more bias in their response to specific voter concerns compared to MEPs facing lower electoral incentives. More bias indicates that performing the act of responding is not due to an internal desire to respond, but affected by the possibility of external reward, here re-election.

### **Experimental Design**

In our experiment voters from the 28 different member states send an email in their respective language to a MEP from their country. The voters were nationals from 28 member states who were all eligible to vote in the May 2014 EP election. Voters volunteered to participate in this experiment and received 10 pounds to compensate them for their time. We conducted our field experiment on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 at several universities in different EU member states to ensure the inclusion of voters from 28 different nationalities. All emails were sent on the same day within a three hour period from personal Gmail accounts at six different locations: University of Oxford, University of Nottingham, the European University Institute, the University of Southern Denmark and the University of Tartu. All the 766 members of the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014) received one email message. Responsiveness is captured through whether the MEP responded within a four weeks period excluding the holiday season (until the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 2014).<sup>6</sup> It is important to note here that election campaigns in the European context are rather short compared to

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<sup>6</sup> Some readers may object that what we are capturing here is not the response of the MEP per se, but rather a response from her staff. We found that in a third of response cases it was indeed the MEP assistants who responded on behalf of the MEP, we think that this captures legislator responsiveness nonetheless as these MEPs apparently value constituency service so much that they are willing to spend resources towards it.

what one might be used to in the US. This is important as timing the experiment within the context of an election campaign might bias our study in favour of extrinsic motivations. The start of the 2014 EP election campaign was not until late March or early April as the leading candidates and manifestos of the key parliamentary groups were not officially ratified until the beginning of March 2014, a considerable time after our experiment was conducted.<sup>7</sup>

Figure 1 below provides an overview of the response rates per EU member state. Roughly 29 percent responded to voter messages compared to more than 50 percent of U.S. representatives in similar studies. We do find considerable cross-national variation in response rates. Whilst in Luxembourg or Slovenia, roughly three-quarters of members of the EP responded. Less than a quarter of Lithuanian or French MEPs replied. No clear regional patterns emerge from the response rates. Note that small countries have small delegations and thus small sample sizes; making both positive and negative outliers more likely due to sheer randomness. Interestingly, there is significant variation in the response rates of the bailed-out member states, with Ireland, Cyprus and Spain displaying relatively high response rates and Greece relatively low. The fact that we find an overall rather modest response rate contrasts results from past surveys that show that members of the EP find it extremely important to represent their constituents, 75.1 percent of members claim this to be one of their most important aspects of their work, and 81.8 percent of members consider online and e-mail activity crucial to do so (Farrell, Hix and Scully 2010). Although many may well work hard and conscientiously for their constituents, in direct communication with voters they lag behind their US counterparts.

*Table 1 about here*

The content of the messages were randomized in terms of the issues voters raised: public

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<sup>7</sup> For example the winner of the 2014 EP election, the European People's Party, chose its leading candidate Jean-Claude Juncker and adopted its electoral manifesto not until 6-7 of March during their party congress in Dublin (see <http://www.epp.eu/6-7-march-epp-hold-congress-dublin-heads-state-and-government-2000-participants-process-select-epp> accessed 1/4/15).

debt versus social expenditure and Europe versus national concerns. In total our experiment consisted of four treatment conditions: 1) a social inequality-national message, 2) a social inequality-EU message, 3) a public debt-national message and 4) a public debt-EU message. We randomly assigned each MEP to one of these different treatment groups with block randomization on left/right ideology. Half of either the left-wing or right-wing MEPs received a public debt message and the other half a social inequality message.

The content of the message was chosen to capture the two-dimensional nature of party and electoral in the EP. Competition in the EP although dominated by left/right considerations is two-dimensional in nature consisting of: 1) a pro/anti state intervention in the economy, and 2) a pro/anti pooling of more national competences to the EU level dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). Varying the voter messages in terms of social inequality and public debt captures left /right ideological positions while the references to the level of government relate to the pooling of competences at the EU versus national level. The text of email is presented in the box below and the words that are underlined reflect the different treatment conditions.

Dear *[Name of MEP]*,

My name is *[Name of Voter]*. I am trying to decide who to vote for in the upcoming EP elections and would like to get some more information. I am well aware that there are many challenges that face us today, but I am particularly worried about the growing social inequality/ public debt in the UK/ EU. I think that the Cameron Government/ Barroso Commission should do something about it. For example, it should increase social expenditure/ tighten the budget in the coming years. I would like to know if you have taken any actions to do so recently or if you have plans to do so in the future. Thank you very much in advance.

Best wishes,

*[Name of Voter]*

## **Ethical Considerations**

Our experiment was ethically approved by the Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford (C1A13-278). In every field experiment there were many ethical concerns to consider in terms of the design of the study and its implications for future work. First, field experiments should ideally aim to avoid deception. Although some previous studies on legislator responsiveness use emails with fake aliases (see for example Broockman 2013, Carnes and Holbein, 2013), scholars have raised concerns about deliberately deceiving legislators (see Butler, Karpowitz and Pope 2012 for example). A study by Butler and colleagues (2012) uses a research design that avoids deception in that it uses real voters (college students who were eligible to vote for the legislators in the study) who sent letters to their own legislators. We decided to follow a similar experimental set-up compared to Butler, Karpowitz and Pope (2012) in order to avoid deception. We designed a truthful experiment in which real voters registered and eligible to vote in the 2014 EP elections send emails to their MEPs. These voters participated on a voluntary basis using their own names. In addition, they were free to communicate further via email (or otherwise) with the MEP they contacted, but asked not to disclose the fact that the initial email was part of an experiment. By using real voters we do not have to invent aliases and mislead elected representatives. As Dickson (2011) suggests there is a real difference between withholding information from and actively deceiving subjects, our approach withholds but does not deceive. Using real actual voters that write to MEPs of their country about real problems they face is of course much more demanding in terms of organisation, yet it does not jeopardize the use of field experiments in tackling important societal issues like legislator responsiveness that fake emails with false aliases would. This is important, as we do not wish to aggravate MEPs.

In addition, our study aims to minimize any harm to our study participants as our experimental database does not include any information that could identify individual MEPs or voters. In this way, we cannot derive any inferences about individual MEPs, yet we warrant that no individual MEP can be singled out and be harmed by the results of the study. The same argument



holds true for political parties. Thus we will not refer to specific national or European parties in our results. Broockman (2013: 527) mentions the importance of this approach as it also limits negative effects for future studies or funding for field experiments. Elected officials, he mentions, “have so not shown signs of reacting negatively to this work in debates over support for political science.” What is more, they have actively decided to fund it.

Finally, we also aimed to limit the time burden placed on MEPs as much as possible. Although it is clearly important to examine constituency service in the EP, we as researchers have an obligation not to overburden legislators’ time. The emails sent in the context of our experiment were short and asked legislators for information about their own activities. Therefore they should be straightforward to answer if an MEP wished to do so.

## **Empirical Results**

We first examine the effect of each of the two types of motivations on responsiveness of MEPs separately. We start with extrinsic motivations and then go on to explore intrinsic motivations. We measure extrinsic motivations by capturing the different electoral incentives MEPs face. We expect responsiveness of MEPs to increase when electoral incentives are more apparent. This applies to MEPs who are up for re-election, especially in open-list systems. Legislators who are not planning to seek renewal of their term in the EP lack such electoral incentives. Even among those planning to stand for re-election, responsiveness matters only when voters can denote their preference among the party candidates, i.e. in open-list systems. In closed-list systems legislators’ electoral fortunes are contingent upon their relative position in the party list. Therefore, responsiveness to voter messages is far less important for re-election.

To test this expectation we examine whether standing for re-election increases the propensity to respond and whether this effect varies according to electoral rules. Following our line of argument, we distinguish between open- and closed-list systems. We thus use two binary variables as predictors: one denoting MEPs who stood for re-election in 2014 and another denoting

countries that use an open-list system.<sup>8</sup> More importantly, we also include their interaction as a way to capture any moderating effect of the electoral system on the role of re-election.

Since neither the decision to continue one's career as an MEP nor the electoral system in the EP election is randomly assigned, we need to consider potential confounding factors. First, we believe that a crucial source of unobserved heterogeneity stems from the degree of path dependence behind the decision to stand for re-election. We try to account for this by controlling for the number of previous terms served. In so doing we aim at capturing both fatigue, aging effects and unobserved taste for this role relative to alternative career paths in politics. To further control for the fact that re-election aspirations might signal differential level of engagement with the European Parliament, as a second control we also include a counter of the number of different positions each MEP held during the 2009-2014 term. Third, we add a dummy that switches on for female MEPs. Finally, we remain agnostic about the underlying systemic factors determining the electoral system of a given country and we try to account for them with the inclusion of country-fixed effects. Combining all these elements, the following model is estimated:

$$P(\text{Response}_{ij} = 1) = \alpha_j + \beta_1 \text{Open-List} + \beta_2 \text{Re-election} + \beta_3 (\text{Open-List})(\text{Re-election}) + \gamma_1 \text{Female} + \gamma_2 \text{Positions} + \gamma_3 \text{TermsEP} + u_i$$

where  $i$  indexes MEPs,  $j$  denotes countries and  $\beta$ 's and  $\gamma$ 's are constants to be estimated from the data. In all our analyses we use a Linear Probability Model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Results remain substantively identical when using a binary response model for the estimation of the parameters of interest (results available upon request).

The results appear in Table 1 and are displayed graphically in Figure 2. We see that whereas

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<sup>8</sup> Each of 28 EU member states decide on their own electoral rules as long as it is a form of proportional representation (PR). While some countries employ closed list systems where parties present lists of candidates and voters can only choose between parties (for example in France, Greece, Italy, Romania or the UK), other countries employ open list systems where voters express candidate preferences (for example in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Slovenia) (see the articles 20, 22 and 223 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the European Parliament Electoral Procedures).

standing for re-election makes no difference in whether MEPs within closed-list systems respond, it increases the chances of responding by less than 10% in open-list systems. Although the effect size could indicate that extrinsic motivations matter for responsiveness, the degree of uncertainty accompanying this estimate is very high. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that we do not find clear evidence that extrinsic motivations can account for differences in response rates amongst MEPs.

*Table 1 and Figure 2 about here*

Yet, it could of course be that although extrinsic motivations might not affect response rates, they nonetheless affect which type of messages MEPs are most likely to respond to. Recall that we theorized that if we do not find differences in response rates due to the type of message, response is likely due to an internal desire (intrinsic motivation) to be responsive no matter which issues a voter raised. In a next step we explore the average treatment effects based on different message content. Table 2 and Figure 3 below show that on average we find no differences in the probability of responding based on differences in message content. MEPs are equally likely to respond to an EU versus national or Left versus Right message. These results lend further credence to the idea that constituency service in the EP is largely based on intrinsic motivations. When MEPs respond, they are equally likely to respond to all voters no matter the specific content of their concerns.

*Table 2 and Figure 3 about here*

We explore the effect of message content even further as we want to be able to rule out that the lack of differences based on messages content may be due to the policy positions of MEPs. It could be the case for example that leftwing MEPs respond more to Left messages and less to right messages and the reverse is true for rightwing MEPs. This would cancel out the differences in responses at the aggregate. What is more, any evidence of this kind of differential response would

indicate that legislators do respond strategically to their own constituents.

In order to explore this possibility, we interact the message content with the policy stance of the MEP. Although we do not have full information on the attitudes of individual MEPs towards the EU or the left/right, we can still test this hypothesis by using information about their party stances on this issue. We obtain this information from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (henceforth CHES, for more information see Bakker et al 2015), which provides an overall measure of EU stances, ranging from 1 (anti-EU) to 7 (pro-EU) as well as measures tapping into left/right positions.<sup>9</sup> We will explore the results for the EU versus national messages first. We expect that the higher the party score is the more likely legislators are to respond to the EU message. By the same token, the lower this value is the more likely are MEPs to respond to the national message. We test this expectation by interacting this variable with a binary indicator that denotes EU messages.

The results appear in the first column of Table 3 and are displayed graphically in Figure 4. There is no indication that holding more pro-EU stances increases the likelihood of responding to a European rather than a national message. The results reveal again cast doubt on the role of extrinsic incentives for MEP responsiveness.

*Table 3 and Figure 4 about here*

One criticism against the analysis performed above, could be that extrinsic motivations based on EU versus national message content might manifest themselves not only via convergence. Rather, MEPs who are opposed to the EU might also feel extrinsically motivated to respond if they hold strong views on the issue. In more general, it could be that extrinsic incentives are driven more by the salience of the issue rather than the exact position of party on this issue. To test this expectation, we use two different measures. First we fold the original 1-7 scale so as to capture

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<sup>9</sup> We have also replicated all analyses using a 3-scale categorical variable, in which we distinguished in a more coarse way between positive, neutral and negative views on the EU. All these results can become available upon request, will be included in the online appendix of the paper and produce substantially identical patterns.

intensity of preference rather than direction (Proksch and Lo 2012). The new measure ranges from 0 (centrist position in the original scale) to 3, which clusters together strong anti- and pro-EU stances (1 and 7 respectively). Second, we also use the Chapel Hill item on EU salience, which ranges from 1 (very low salience) to 7 (EU highly salient). Following the previous analytical strategy, each of these items is interacted with the EU message binary indicator. The results from these analyses are shown in the second and third columns of Table 3. None of the two measures seems to confirm the idea that salience matters. The salience of the EU as an issue within the party of the MEP does not seem to enhance the chances of responding to the EU message. Combined, these two sets of results suggest that extrinsic motivations are less pivotal than intrinsic motivations in MEP responsiveness, at least when it comes to EU versus National messages.

We now turn to the role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations with respect to the Left versus Right messages. We follow the same logic as with the EU versus National messages in that we expect that convergence between the message and legislator's views will increase the chances of responding to the email. The recipients of the mail were asked to comment on two problems: either balanced budget or inequality. The first condition signals right-wing orientations whereas the second captures left-wing priorities. Accordingly we expect that MEPs of left-wing parties will have stronger electoral incentives to respond to a message asking to fight inequalities rather than budget deficits. By the same token, we expect MEPs of right-wing parties to respond more to a message targeting balanced budgets rather than calls for decreasing inequality.

We use three indicators provided in the 2010 round of CHES to capture ideological preferences. First, we use a generic and encompassing left-right scale. Moreover we build on the fact that the content of the message emphasizes the economic dimension of this scale. We use a 0-10 scale on the trade-off between tax spending and welfare state; and another 0-10 scale on views about redistribution. All three indicators are coded so that higher values denote more right-wing opinions (pro-tax reduction and anti-redistribution stances). We interact each of these measures with a binary indicator switching on for those MEPs who received the Right message. We expect that as

the party is more to the right the probability of responding to this message compared to the left message should increase. The results appear in Table 4 and Figure 5. The evidence suggests that there is no change in the probability of responding to a message closer to one's views. This is the case for all three indicators used to measure MEPs' policy stances. Taken as a whole, the results are in line with the intrinsic motivations hypothesis and provide little support for the extrinsic hypothesis.<sup>10</sup>

*Table 4 and Figure 5 about here*

Finally, we turn to the last hypothesis by exploring how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact and shape constituency service in the EP parliament. In the line with the work on the overjustification effect (see Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981, Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000 for example), we expect extrinsic motivations to crowd out intrinsic ones. Specifically, when extrinsic motivations are absent, intrinsic ones should find more room to influence the decision of the legislator to be responsive. Yet, when extrinsic motivations are apparent the need for intrinsic incentives becomes less pivotal in determining response. We test this hypothesis by interacting our treatments with the electoral incentives MEPs face. Figure 6 below shows the differences in differences in probabilities of responding to an EU versus National messages for different electoral incentives, that is to say for MEPs who are up re-election or not versus those running within open versus closed list systems, and we do this for MEPs who are either pro-, anti- or neutral when it comes to the EU. If extrinsic motivations indeed crowd out intrinsic motivations, we should find that the differences in the probabilities of responding to an EU

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<sup>10</sup> In the case of the Left/Right message, the logic of salience does not apply as there is no reason to believe that those who hold strong opinions on these issues are more likely to respond to a left versus a right message (or the other way round). A test that could be thought of as equivalent to the salience test used in the case of the EU/National treatments would be to ignore the content of the message in terms of the left/right dichotomy and look at whether more extreme ideological views help us predict higher levels of responsiveness. To test this idea, we simply regressed the probability of responding against each of the three ideological measures from the 2010 CHES round, folded so that centrist positions score 0 and extreme positions score 5. We found no evidence of increased constituency service among MEPs who hold more extreme views (full results shown in the online appendix).

versus National message should be statistically significantly different for closed versus open list systems and for those MEPs who are up for re-election versus those who are not.

*Figure 6 about here*

The results in Figure 6 show that we find partial evidence for our crowding out/overjustification hypothesis. While the differences-in-differences in responding to EU versus national messages across MEPs within more pro-, anti-EU or EU-neutral stances are indeed significant for open versus closed systems, they are not for re-election. This indicates that MEPs are more likely to respond differently to specific voter concerns when they face higher electoral incentives for constituency service, but only due to the electoral rules they face. MEPs within open list systems are more likely to respond to voter messages in line with their ideological stance whilst ignoring voter messages that conflict with their stances. This indicates that extrinsic motivations at least partially crowd out intrinsic motivations to respond, and corroborates work from social psychology and behavioural economics demonstrating an overjustification effect.

## **Discussion: Modest Legislator Responsiveness in the EP Based Primarily on Intrinsic**

### **Motivations**

Constituency service is an important part of legislators' activities. The reason why some legislators are more responsive to voters than others is therefore a topic of key debate amongst political scientists. Recent evidence using field experiments in the US context suggests that legislators are primarily voter seekers and are responsive based on instrumental concerns relating to re-election (Grose 2010, Butler and Nickerson 2011, Dropp and Peskowitz 2012). Yet, the evidence to date might be slightly biased towards extrinsic motivations given the personal character of the US electoral rules and campaign structure. This study details evidence from the first ever field experiment conducted in the EP. The institutional features of the EP and the design of our

experiment allowed us to go beyond the current state of the art in two distinct ways. First, we were able to harvest a unique feature of the EP namely that its legislators are elected under starkly different electoral rules, namely open list versus closed list PR. Therefore MEPs face starkly different electoral incentives to be responsive to voters (Carey and Shugart 1995). Second, our experiment was able to capture the way in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact. The interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations has largely been unexplored in the literature on legislative behaviour thus far, but featured prominently in the work of social psychologists and behavioural economists. This body of work suggests that extrinsic motivations “crowd out” intrinsic ones.

We report three key results. First, our results indicate that compared to US legislators, constituency service of MEPs is rather weak. Given that the personalised ballot and campaign context in the US increases extrinsic motivations for constituency service, this finding may not be entirely surprising. Elections to the EP are based on various forms of PR where often parties rather than candidates dominate electoral campaigns. As a result, constituency service should on average be less extensive in the EU context compared to the US. This is indeed what our findings seem to suggest. Second, our analysis shows that intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivations shape constituency service in the EP. We do not find evidence that MEPs who face higher electoral incentives, who are up re-election in open-list systems, are more responsive than legislators in closed-list systems. What is more, when MEPs respond, they do not display any kind of response bias due to the specific concerns raised by voters. This again seems indicative of the importance of intrinsic motivations for responsiveness. The latter finding seems “good news” for the EP as while response rate overall is modest, voters can expect legislators to respond in an unbiased fashion to any concern they might have. Third, our findings suggest that extrinsic motivations partly crowd out MEPs’ intrinsic motivations to be responsive, especially within open list systems. This result is especially interesting in light of the fact that open list PR systems are increasingly popular among constitution makers. It argued that open list PR empowers voters by giving them the opportunity to



make more fine-grained choices than closed list systems.<sup>11</sup> Yet, the results of this study showing that constituency service within open list systems displays more biased responsiveness partially qualifies this enthusiasm about open list PR systems.

Taken together, our evidence suggests that constituency service in the EP is rather underdeveloped and shaped by intrinsic motivations. Contrary to the US context, extrinsic motivations seem far less important drivers of constituency service. This conclusion is also supported by a closer inspection of which MEPs up for re-election were actually re-elected in the 2014 EP election in Figure 7 below. Our evidence suggests that MEPs who responded to voter messages in the context of our experiment were no more or less likely to be re-elected in the subsequent EP election.

*Figure 7 about here*

The evidence presented here sheds an important new light on which motivations for legislator responsiveness. Within PR contexts like the EP intrinsic motivations seem to shape constituency service. Yet, the electoral context within legislators operate does seem to affect responsiveness as intrinsic motivations to be responsive are dampened within open list PR systems. Our findings also inform the popular debate about the possible democratic deficiencies of EU institutions. Due to the fact that EU politics is often characterized by voter low interest and scant media attention, receiving a response from one's MEP might carry a significant weight for perceptions about the parliament or decisions to participate in European elections (Rohrschneider 2002, Føllesdal and Hix 2006, Hobolt, 2012, Hobolt and Tilly 2014). Consequently, the overall lack of responsiveness that seems to characterize the EP might dampen this citizen engagement even further. That being said, our finding that when MEPs respond, they are largely unbiased in terms of to which concerns they respond, might provide some relief for defenders of democracy in the EU.

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<sup>11</sup> For example in 2009 Indonesia changed from closed to open list PR and Iraq did the same in 2010 (Case 2015, O'Sullivan and Al-Saiedi 2014).

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
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## Tables and Figures



**Figure 1: Response Rates Grouped by Country**


Note: The dots indicate the proportion of MEPs that replied to the email message as a percentage of all MEPs from the same country.

**Table 1: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response Rate**

	P( <i>Response</i> =1)
Re-election	.002 (.039)
Open-List	-.125 (.121)
<i>(Re-election) × (Open-List)</i>	.096 (.071)
Female	.065 (.033)
Positions in EP	.020 (.017)
Terms in EP	.012 (.007)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Effect of Re-election in Open-List Systems: $\beta_2 + \beta_3$	.098 (.059)
n	766
R-Squared	.131
Mean Squared Error	.429

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.





**Figure 2: Probability of Responding Conditional on Extrinsic Motivations**


Note: Predicted values and associated 95% confidence intervals stem from simulations (using CLARIFY, Tomz et al. 2002) based on Table 1, setting all control variables at their median values and gender at its model (male) category.

**Table 2: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Intrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific Message Content**

	Coefficients
Right-national message	.010 (.044)
Left-EU message	.046 (.045)
Right-EU	.042 (.045)
Female	.063 (.033)*
Positions in EP	.019 (.017)
Terms in EP	.015 (.007)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
n	702
R-Squared	.130
Mean Squared Error	.429

Note: Left-national message is the reference category. Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

\* significant at  $p \leq .05$  level.



**Figure 3: Average Treatment Effects of EU vs National and Left vs Right Messages**

Note: The dots denotes the difference in the probability of responding to an EU versus a National message and to a Left versus a Right message, based on Table 2. The dashed lines capture the 95% CIs.


**Table 3: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific Message Content, EU-National Messages**

	EU-Position	EU-Position Folded	EU-Saliience
EU message	.033 (.124)	.024 (.102)	.030 (.224)
EU-Position	.028 (.017)		
EU-Position <i>Folded</i>		.024 (.036)	
EU Saliience			.033 (.062)
<i>(EU Message)×(EU Position)</i>	-.006 (.022)		
<i>(EU Message)×(EU Position Folded)</i>		-.014 (.050)	
<i>(EU Message)×(EU Saliience)</i>			-.011 (.074)
Female	.056 (.035)*	.065 (.034)*	.066 (.035)*
Positions in EP	.019 (.017)	.021 (.017)	.021 (.018)
Terms in EP	.015 (.007)*	.015 (.007)*	.015 (.008)*
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
n	702	702	702
R-Squared	.136	.132	.132
Mean Squared Error	.430	.431	.431

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

\* significant at  $p \leq .05$  level.

## EU vs National Message



**Figure 4: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Probability in Responding to EU vs National Message**

Note: The solid line denotes the difference in the probability of responding to an EU versus a National message based on Table 3, conditional on the legislator's position in the EU-related variable shown in the horizontal axis. The histograms present in the form of fractions the density of the moderating variable, i.e. EU-position, EU position-folded, and EU salience in the first, second and third panel respectively. The dashed curves capture the 95% CIs.


**Table 4: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific Message Content, Left-Right Message**

	Left-Right	Tax-Spending	Redistribution
Right message	.006 (.094)	.045 (.082)	.016 (.083)
LR-Position	-.004 (.012)		
Tax-Spending Position		.003 (.011)	
Redistribution			.002 (.012)
<i>(Right Message) × (Left-Right)</i>	.006 (.016)		
<i>(Right Message) × (Tax-Spending)</i>		-.001 (.015)	
<i>(Right Message) × (Redistribution)</i>			.004 (.016)
Female	.065 (.034)*	.066 (.034)*	.067 (.034)*
Positions in EP	.021 (.017)	.021 (.018)	.022 (.018)
Terms in EP	.015 (.007)*	.014 (.007)*	.014 (.008)*
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
n	702	702	702
R-Squared	.133	.133	.133
Mean Squared Error	.430	.430	.430

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.


\* significant at  $p \leq .05$  level.

## Right Vs Left Message



**Figure 5: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Difference in the Probability of Response to Left vs Right Message**


Note: The solid line denotes the difference in the probability of responding to an right versus a left message (i.e. fighting deficits versus combatting inequalities), conditional on the legislator's ideological position, measured through: a) a LR scale; b) a scale on reducing taxes versus spending on welfare; and c) a scale measuring attitudes towards redistribution. All three scales are taken from the Chapel Hill expert survey. The histograms present in the form of fractions the density of each of these variables. The dashed curves capture the 95% CIs.



**Figure 6: Difference-In-Differences between Treatment and Type of Electoral Incentives, EU vs National Message**

Note: The dots denote the difference in the probability of responding to a EU versus national message between open and closed list systems and between MEPs who are up for re-election and those who are not up for re-election, as they become more in favour of the EU with 95 % CIs.





**Figure 7: Re-election Rates in 2014 EP Election by Response in our Experiment**